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CHAPTER 14 
Contracts 
RICHARD G. HUBER 
§14.I. Restitution: Unjust enrichment. Previous ANNUAL SURVEY 
volumes have indicated the developing interest in restitution 1 and the 
difficulties existing in the selection of proper remedies.2 The Supreme 
Judicial Court, in the case of Douillette v. Parmenter,S undertook 
further to clarify several aspects of restitutionallaw. The plaintiff had 
been invited by the defendant to live on her farm with the promise 
that she would deed the plaintiff some land on which to build a house. 
The defendant pointed out the land on which the plaintiff could 
build and at least acquiesced in the building until the house was 
nearly completed. The defendant then told the plaintiff he would 
have to leave because he could have no more water. The plaintiff 
sued in contract for services rendered and materials furnished, but 
the Supreme Judicial Court held he could not recover in the action, 
there being no express or implied contract for services and materials. 
The Court found that the plaintiff's move to the farm and not his 
furnishing of services and materials was the consideration for the 
promise to deed. 
The Court indicated, however, that the plaintiff could recover in 
a suit in equity for unjust enrichment because the defendant's con-
duct could be found to have been tantamount to fraud. The Court 
stated that, although this principle has not been recognized previously 
in the Commonwealth, there is ample authority from other jurisdic-
tions for the principle.4 The record does not indicate that there was 
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§14.1. 11955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.3. 
21956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.1. 
S 335 Mass. 305. 139 N.E.2d 526 (1957). 
4 The Supreme Judicial Court cited the following authorities: Fisher v. Kennedy. 
106 Conn. 484. 492-493, 495, 138 Atl. 503, 506-507 (1927); Johnson v. Armfield. 130 
N.C. 575, 41 S.E. 705 (1902); Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, 1 Johns. Ch. 273. 286 
(N.Y. Ch. 1814), rev'd on other grounds. 14 Johns. 15 (N.Y. 1816); Worth v. Worth, 
84 Ill. 442. 445 (1887); Schneider v. Reed. 123 Wis. 488, 499. 101 N.W. 682. 685 
(1905); 2 Williston. Contracts §537 (rev. ed. 1936); Woodward, Quasi Contracts §102 
(1913). 
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actual fraud at the time the plaintiff came out to the land and com-
menced building his home, although there is some evidence that the 
defendant may have decided not to deed the property to the plain-
tiff a short time before he was ordered off the land and while he was 
still working on the house.5 Even if there was no fraud on the de-
fendant's part, there is authority recognizing the plaintiff's right to 
recover because of his mistaken belief that his services would inure to 
his benefit with the defendant's concurrent knowledge of his mistaken 
belief.6 The Court in the present case, however, primarily cites as 
authority cases in which services have been rendered in reliance upon 
a contract voidable under the Statute of Frauds.7 This is the most 
acceptable of the three possible bases for restitutional recovery in the 
present case. The basis of fraud is inexact since there was no actual 
fraud except possibly just before the plaintiff was ordered to leave. 
Even if American courts accepted the theory of "constructive fraud" 
as the English courts have,S the facts of this case do not fit it within 
any established area of "constructive fraud."9 The basis of mistake 
on the part of the plaintiff with knowledge of the mistake on the part 
of the defendant, although possibly supportable from the record, would 
similar to the fraud basis have to be supported by a finding that the 
defendant really never intended to deed the property to the plaintiff. 
On the other hand, the record clearly shows that the original contract 
to deed was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds and yet the 
defendant obtained a benefit from the plaintiff because of the original 
understanding between the parties. As the authorities cited by the 
Court, as well as other authority, establish, restitution is a proper 
remedy in this Statute of Frauds situation.10 
In cases of unjust enrichment induced by fraud, the damages 
awarded have been the market value of services rendered and ma-
terials furnished, irrespective of benefit to the defendant.ll Even if 
we accept as a proper theory of recovery not the fraud of the defendant 
but the mistaken belief of the plaintiff of which the defendant knew, 
the measure of recovery is still the reasonable value of services and 
materials furnished rather than the benefit conferred on the de-
fendant.12 The Court in the present case held, however, that the proper 
measure of damages was the benefit conferred upon the defendant less 
52 Restatement of Contracts §471; Restatement of Restitution §8. 
6 Restatement of Restitution §40 (c) and Comment d. 
7 Johnson v. Armfield, 130 N.C. 575, 41 S.E. 705 (1902); Parkhurst v. Van Cort-
landt, 1 Johns. Ch_ 273, 286 (N.Y. Ch. 1814), rev'd on other grounds, 14 Johns_ 15 
(N.Y. 1816); 2 Williston, Contracts §537 (rev. ed. 1936); Woodward, Quasi Con-
tracts §107 (1913). 
8 Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sr. 125, 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch. 1750). 
93 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §§922-923 (5th ed., Symons, 1941). 
10 See note 7 supra; 2 Restatement of Contracts §355; Restatement of Restitution 
§108; Keener, Quasi-Contracts 278 (r893). 
11 Restatement of Restitution §152. 
12Id. §40, Comment f; d. M. Ahern Co. v. John Bowen Co., 334 Mass. 36, 133 
N.E.2d 484 (1956), noted in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.1. 
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the value of any benefits which accrued to the plaintiff. The latter 
requirement is clearly correct since there would be a duty, in any 
restitutional situation, for the plaintiff to account for benefits he has 
received, which in the present case would at least include the rental 
value of the house during his occupancy of it.1s The Court cites, as 
authority for its theory of damages, cases in which contracts are void 
because of a condition not being fulfilled 14 and authorities in which 
contracts are void under the Statute of Frauds.15 Since the present 
case is most properly a case for restitution for benefits conferred under 
a contract void under the Statute of Frauds, the measure of damages 
prescribed by the Court is the proper one. In most cases, of course, 
the benefit and services rendered theories of measure of damages would 
produce substantially equivalent damages. There is a danger, how-
ever, that the Court, because of its language identifying the defendant's 
actions in the present case as tantamount to fraud, may have tended 
to bind itself to an inadequate measure of damages in a future case 
in which restitution is sought on the basis of actual fraud and little 
or no benefit was conferred upon the defendant despite substantial 
rendition of services by the plaintiff.16 
The choice of remedy in a case involving restitution is always a 
difficult one in jurisdictions that have maintained technical pleading 
distinctions. The law of restitution developed in both equity and 
law courts and it is difficult to determine which court system developed 
a particular theory of recovery,17 The Court in the present case re-
quired the plaintiff to seek amendment of his petition to change it 
from contract to equity, holding that the form of restitutional re-
covery he could obtain was only available in equity. This was the 
prevalent view when most jurisdictions retained the niceties of com-
mon law pleading, although the rejection of recovery in contract on 
a general assumpsit theory was criticized even at that time.18 Since 
money recovery only is being sought in the present case, a recovery in 
contract might have been supported. Litigants, however, are less 
interested in any possible theoretical arguments on selection of rem-
edies than in knowing what remedy to use, and henceforth Massa-
chusetts litigants will have this information available in situations 
similar to the present case. 
IS Restatement of Restitution §159 (I). 
14 Fischer v. Kennedy, 106 Conn. 484, 495, 138 At!. 503, 507 (1927); Dix v. Marcy, 
116 Mass. 416, 418 (1875). 
15 Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, I Johns. Ch. 273, 287 (N.Y. Ch. 1814), rev'd on 
other grounds, 14 Johns. 15 (N.Y. 1816); 2 Williston, Contracts §537 n.l (rev. ed. 
1936); Woodward, Quasi Contracts §107 (1913). 
16 The Court has, however, refused to follow the benefit theory in all cases. For 
a recent case see M. Ahern Co. v. John Bowen Co., 334 Mass. 36, 133 N.E.2d 484 
(1956), discussed in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.1. 
17 Restatement of Restitution, Introduotory Note; Woodward, Quasi Contracts 
§§2, 6 (1913). 
18 Keener, Quasi-Contracts 369 (1893). 
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§ 14.2. Existing impossibility of performance; Breach of contract: 
Restitution. The performance of a contract may be impossible either 
owing to factors that existed at the time the contract was made or 
because of events occurring between the time of contracting and the 
time of performance. In Boston Plate & Window Glass Co. v. John 
Bowen CO.,1 the Court had to determine if, in an action for breach 
of contract, the plaintiff could recover when performance was im-
possible at the time the contract was made. Bowen's bid on a state 
hospital had been incorrectly accepted; its bid was not actually low, 
as appeared, because it had not used the required statutory procedures.2 
Before Bowen's bid was found to have been improperly accepted, 
Bowen had subcontracted two jobs with the Glass Company. The 
Glass Company had not performed under the subcontracts before it 
was found that the Bowen bid had been incorrectly accepted, but it 
had done certain work and incurred expenses preparatory to per-
formance. The Court refused to allow damages to the plaintiff for 
breach of contract. 
When a contract is, from the outset, impossible of performance and 
yet one or both parties have acted on it to their detriment, the question 
of who should bear the loss involves a difficult policy decision for the 
courts.3 If contracting parties realized at the time of contracting that 
one of their performances was impossible because of events then exist-
ing, we can assume they either would not have contracted or would 
indicate who was to bear the loss in case the factors preventing per-
formance did not disappear before time for performance. The Court's 
decision in the present case that the loss falls on the promisee rather 
than the promisor agrees with the Restatement of Contracts 4 and 
the decisions of most courts that have decided the problem.5 A com-
plicating factor in the present case, however, was that the impossibility 
was caused by the negligence of the defendant in using improper bid-
ding procedure. The Court did not consider this fact pertinent, 
holding that it would only be considered if the original contract be-
tween the defendant and the Commonwealth would have been valid 
except for Bowen's conduct. Since Bowen was not the actual low 
bidder, no contract between Bowen and the Commonwealth ever 
existed; the subcontracts were thus impossible of performance from 
the outset, since they specifically depended upon the general contract. 
While the logic of this argument is impressive, defendant still created 
the impossibility by his conduct. Courts have not uniformly held the 
promisor free in cases of existing impossibility; certainly if the 
promisor knows of the impossibility at the time of contracting, the 
§14.2. 11957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 551, 141 N.E.2d 715. 
2 This was decided in Gifford v. Commissioner of Public Health, 328 Mass. 608, 
105 N.E.2d 476 (1952). 
36 Corbin, Contracts §1321 (1951). 
4 §456. 
5See 6 Williston, Contracts §§1937, 1951 (rev. ed. 1938); 6 Corbin, Contracts 
§§1326, 1339 (1951). 
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transaction may be voidable for fraud.6 The present case might have 
been analogized to the fraud situation by the Court, on a theory that 
the defendant should have known of the impossibility at the time 
it contracted with the plaintiff. Decisions in this area are, however, 
policy decisions; the courts attempt to reach the just result, consid-
ering business practice, the moral standards of the community and 
other such factors.T The defendant in the present case was faced 
with a complicated statute regulating bidding procedure. There is no 
evidence that it deliberately evaded the statutory requirements in 
order to appear low bidder, and certainly the agents of the Common-
wealth, in accepting the bid, were also negligent. It thus may be 
entirely fair that in this precise case of negligence the promisor not 
be liable for breach of contract; it is, however, easy to foresee pos-
sible cases in which negligence of a promisor might be sufficiently 
unjustifiable so as to warrant holding him liable even in the absence 
of a showing of his actual knowledge of the impossibility. 
In the present case the Court also holds out hope to the plaintiff 
that it might recover in an action other than for breach of contract; 
without deciding, the Court states that plaintiff might recover resti-
tutionally under the common counts. In the case of M. Ahern Co. v. 
John Bowen CO.,8 which arose out of the same factual situation as 
the present case but involved a different subcontractor, the plaintiff 
recovered restitution ally for the value of his part performance. The 
plaintiff in the present case has not performed but has only incurred 
. certain expenses in preparation for performance. In a rather com-
plicated construction subcontract situation such as was here involved, 
however, not only the performance of services but also proper prep-
aration for performance properly could be considered part of the 
bargain, and thus restitutional recovery reasonably could be awarded. 
§I4.3. Conditions precedent: Architect's approval. Courts often 
have had difficulty in determining if a condition precedent in an agree-
ment must be met before a contract comes into existence or if the 
contract exists from the time of the original agreement, merely pending 
the occurrence of the condition. A construction subcontract in pur-
chase order form in Louis M. Herman Co. v. Gallagher Electrical Co.1 
required the architect's approval and the Court had to determine if a 
contract existed on the basis of the original purchase order or if the 
contract did not ever come into existence because the architect did not 
approve the order. The plaintiff had bid on the electrical subcontract, 
66 Williston, Contra{;ts §1933 (rev. ed. 1938); 2 Restatement of Contracts §456. 
T 6 Corbin, Contracts §§132I, 1331 (1951). While, as Professor Corbin points out, 
the older decisions in particular do not freely discuss policy, the development of the 
law of impossibility clearly reflects the court's acceptance of business practice and 
prevailing ideas of good faith and reasonableness as determinative of their results 
in cases involving impossibility. 
8334 Mass. 36, 133 N.E.2d 484 (1956), noted in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.1. 
§14.3. 1334 Mass. 652, 138 N.E.2d 120 (1956). 
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the specifications for which required the installation of equipment 
"similar to" Stromberg-Carlson units. Plaintiff's bid substituted RCA 
equipment for the Stromberg-Carlson types listed in the specifications. 
The purchase order dictated by defendant's agent to plaintiff stated: 
"I RCA Sound System As per Plans and Specifications. Subject to 
Approval of Architect and Engineer. Prices as Per Louis M. Herman 
Quotation of 22 Jan. 1954." The defendant knew that the plaintiff 
had done extensive work under this subcontract before it raised the 
question of whether there was a contract. 
The Court construed the purchase order as a contract subject to 
a condition precedent, rather than as a contract that would not come 
into existence until the condition precedent was fulfilled. This result 
was obtained by interpreting the architect's approval to refer to the 
substitution of one sound system for the other, rather than to refer 
to approval of the entire contract. This interpretation follows from 
the Massachusetts authorities in similar cases.2 The Court, however, 
was still faced with the fact that the architect had never approved 
the substitution of one sound equipment for another. The Court 
reviewed evidence that the engineer of the project had recommended 
approval to the architect, that the architect had been hampered by a 
member of the building advisory committee - who had no authority 
to interfere - and that the architect stated he otherwise would have 
approved the substitution of the one sound equipment for the other. 
The Court then rather cryptically stated that the parties were entitled 
to the architect's honest, non-arbitrary and non-fraudulent judgment, 
and that he had failed to decide the question which he had a duty 
to decide. 
When a contract requires the approval of an expert, the condition 
may be excused on certain grounds such as impossibility, fraud or 
gross mistake.3 The cases, however, do not excuse the condition merely 
on the basis that the expert should decide within a reasonable time 
whether he will approve. This is one interpretation that might be 
given to the Court's statement in the Herman case that the architect 
did not carry out his duty to decide. The facts of the case, however, 
and the authorities cited by the Court suggest this was not the Court's 
intent. The architect's failure did not occur because of any negligent 
delay but because of outside pressure that made him intentionally 
delay decision. The cases cited by the Court cover situations in which 
the architect's decision was fraudulent or owing to mistake and lack 
of independence in decision.4 While these cases do not directly apply 
to the present case, they evidence prior recognition by the Court that 
a condition of expert approval may be excused on sufficient grounds. 
2 Coan v. Holbrook, 327 Mass. 221, 97 N.E.2d 649 (1951); Nigro v. Conti, 319 
Mass. 480, 66 N.E.2d 353 (1946); d. Howland v. Plymouth, 319 Mass. 321, 65 N.E.2d 
535 (1946). 
3 1 Restatement of Contracts §303. 
4 Sikora v. Hogan, 315 Mass. 66, 51 N.E.2d 970 (1943); Hurley v. Boston, 244 
Mass. 466. 138 N.E. 838 (1923); Hebert v. Dewey. 191 Mass. 403. 77 N.E. 822 (1906). 
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The Restatement of Contracts, digesting the American cases,5 states 
that a condition requiring approval by an expert may be excused if 
the expert fails to exercise an honest judgment in a situation that in-
volves extreme penalty and if the condition is not an essential part of 
the exchange for the promisor's performance.6 The Massachusetts 
Court has held that an expert's approval is not so essential that other 
means cannot be used to determine rights of parties under a contract.7 
It is a reasonable assumption from the record in the Herman case 
that the plaintiff would be heavily penalized if he could not recover 
contractually for his extensive expenditures and work during the 
six-month period during which he was performing under the contract. 
The architect in the present case did not fraudulently refuse to act, 
in the strict sense of fraud, but he did not exercise an honest judgment 
because of pressures on him. Thus the Court properly excused the 
performance of the condition of the contract requiring the architect's 
approvaI.B 
§14.4. Contracts of indemnity: Death actions. The Supreme 
Judicial Court has held that the usual rule permitting contribution 
among joint tortfeasors not in pari delicto 1 does not apply to suits 
brought under the death statute.2 In Western Union Telegraph Co. 
v. Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Co.} the Court decided that the 
rule for death actions could be modified by a contract for reimburse-
ment. In this case a common ownership arrangement of the plaintiff 
and the defendant included an agreement that, in its essentials, pro-
vided that each party would hold the other harmless for all loss or 
damages occasioned by the other's negligence in relation to its electric 
currents and maintenance of equipment on the commonly owned 
property. Concerning the death action here involved, the plaintiff 
and the defendant agreed that each should be free to settle the claim 
against it for a sum not to exceed $3850, and that any reimbursement 
under the common ownership agreement should include the settle-
ment and expenses. The plaintiff settled for $3250. The defendant 
answered the plaintiff's present suit for reimbursement by claiming the 
plaintiff had suffered no loss or damages under the agreement, since 
there was no judicial determination of the plaintiff's liability for the 
death. The Court rejected this "proof of loss" argument because the 
defendant had stipulated that the plaintiff's settlement was a "reason-
5 See cases collected in 3 Corbin, Contracts §§651, 652 (1951), and 3 Williston, 
Contracts §§794, 797 (rev. ed. 1936). 
6 1 Restatement of Contracts §§302, 303(e). 
7 Hebert v. Dewey, 191 Mass. 403, 411-412, 77 N.E. 822, 825 (1906). 
8 The Court held that the question of estoppel to deny the contract, since the 
defendant had knowingly and without objection permitted the plaintiff to perform 
extensively under the agreement for over six months, was a question of fact that 
should be decided in the lower court. 
§14.4. 1 Gray v. Boston Gas Light Co., 114 Mass. 149, 19 Am. Rep. 324 (1873). 
2 Boott Mills v. Boston & Maine R.R., 218 Mass. 582, 106 N.E. 680 (1914). 
8334 Mass. 587, 137 N.E.2d 459 (1956). 
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able and prudent" one. The defendant also contended the plaintiff 
had suffered no loss under the agreement since, if the death action 
had been tried, the plaintiff would either have won and thus suffered 
no loss or would have lost and thus would not be entitled to reim-
bursement from any joint tortfeasor in a death action. The Court 
found that the common ownership agreement included reimburse-
ment in death actions and thus the general rule for death actions 
did not apply. It also again held that "loss" was established by the 
stipulation of the defendant that the settlement was reasonable and 
prudent. 
The Court has held that judicial determination of liability is not 
required to permit recovery by a party against the one who was the 
means of subjecting the party to a claim if the claim was one against 
which the first party could make no legal defense; the second party, 
however, is not concluded by the amount of the settlement made by 
the first party in paying the original claim and can have a jury 
determine the amount of his liability.4 It is fairly certain that the 
plaintiff in the Western Union case was liable in the death action 
and that the amount of the settlement was no more than a jury would 
find proper in the action. The defendant should not, however, have 
stipulated the fact that the settlement was reasonable and prudent 
since there was always a possibility, even under the agreement between 
the parties, that a jury might have found that the plaintiff was not 
liable and thus suffered no loss in the death action or that the amount 
of the plaintiff's settlement was excessive. While stipulation is of 
great value in insuring prompt settlement of cases, the defendant in 
the present case stipulated away the major part of its defense against 
the plaintiff's claim. 
§14.5. Documents of identification: Exculpatory provisions. While 
primarily a commercial law case,l Polonsky v. Union Federal Savings 
and Loan Assn.2 deals with the perennial contract question of whether 
documents that include exculpatory provisions, but which also have 
an identification purpose, contractually bind those who accept the 
documents. The Court held that acceptance of a pass book evi-
dencing a savings deposit bound the depositor to the exculpatory 
provisions printed on the cover of the book. Although a novel case 
in Massachusetts, most courts that have considered the problem have 
reached the same result.3 The case does, however, raise the question 
of where the dividing line between binding and not binding the 
recipients of these documents may properly be drawn. The present 
4 Inhabitants of Swansey v. Chace, 16 Gray 303 (Mass. 1860). See also Chicago, 
Rock Island & Pacific R.R. v. Dobry Flour Mills, Inc., 211 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1954), 
cert. denied, 348 u.S. 832 (1954). 
§14.5. 1 See the discussion at §§5.2 supra and 18.5 infra. 
2334 Mass. 697, 138 N.E.2d 115 (1956). 
3 See the cases cited by the Court in the Polonsky case, 334 Mass. at 700, 138 
N.E.2d at 117. See also Annotation, 5 A.L.R. 1203 (1919). 
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case follows Massachusetts law by defining the dividing line as be-
tween those documents that purport to set forth a contract and those 
that do not, i.e., those that are primarily means of identification.4 
The Court further holds, however, that in determining this line under 
the prescribed test an important factor is whether it is a matter of 
common knowledge that the document in question contains provisions 
defining the rights of parties. If a "common knowledge" test is gen-
erally adopted, certain documents like baggage checks and hat checks 
will eventually if not Rresently be included in this class, since it is 
likely that most people.know they purport to contain exculpatory pro-
visions. Danger lies in using "common knowledge" since proof of 
such knowledge is very, difficult and the use of judicial notice in such 
circumstances is at best questionable. The primary goal in deciding 
this type of case would seem to be certainty, so that the parties in-
volved have available to them the knowledge of whether they are 
bound; certainty is much more to be desired than a completely logical 
test that might later change the result of previously litigated cases, 
with resulting confusion. As a practical matter the Massachusetts 
decisions have established the desirable certainty but the Court should 
be certain the principles applied to decide these cases do not under-
mine that certainty for the future. 
4 See Kergald v. Annstrong Transfer Express Co., 330 Mass. 254, 113 N.E.2d 53 
(1953), and cases cited. 
9
Huber: Chapter 14: Contracts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1957
